A essential token validation failure in Microsoft Entra ID (beforehand Azure Energetic Listing) may have allowed attackers to impersonate any person, together with International Directors, throughout any tenant.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-55241, has been assigned the utmost CVSS rating of 10.0. It has been described by Microsoft as a privilege escalation flaw in Azure Entra. There is no such thing as a indication that the difficulty was exploited within the wild. It has been addressed by the Home windows maker as of July 17, 2025, requiring no buyer motion.
Safety researcher Dirk-jan Mollema, who found and reported the shortcoming on July 14, mentioned the shortcoming made it attainable to compromise each Entra ID tenant on the planet, with the seemingly exception of nationwide cloud deployments.
The issue stems from a mix of two elements: the usage of service-to-service (S2S) actor tokens issued by the Entry Management Service (ACS) and a deadly flaw within the legacy Azure AD Graph API (graph.home windows.internet) that didn’t adequately validate the originating tenant, which successfully allowed the tokens for use for cross-tenant entry.
What makes this noteworthy is that the tokens are topic to Microsoft’s Conditional Entry insurance policies, enabling a foul actor with entry to the Graph API to make unauthorized modifications. To make issues worse, the shortage of API stage logging for the Graph API meant that it might be exploited to entry person data saved in Entra ID, group and position particulars, tenant settings, utility permissions, and system data and BitLocker keys synced to Entra ID with out leaving any traces.
An impersonation of the International Administrator may enable an attacker to create new accounts, grant themselves extra permissions, or exfiltrate delicate information, leading to a full tenant compromise with entry to any service that makes use of Entra ID for authentication, akin to SharePoint On-line and Alternate On-line.
“It might additionally present full entry to any useful resource hosted in Azure, since these sources are managed from the tenant stage and International Admins can grant themselves rights on Azure subscriptions,” Mollema famous.
Microsoft has characterised such cases of cross-tenant entry as a case of “Excessive-privileged entry” (HPA) that “happens when an utility or service obtains broad entry to buyer content material, permitting it to impersonate different customers with out offering any proof of person context.”
It is value noting that the Azure AD Graph API has been formally deprecated and retired as of August 31, 2025, with the tech big urging customers emigrate their apps to Microsoft Graph. The preliminary announcement of the deprecation was made in 2019.
“Functions that had been configured for prolonged entry that also rely upon Azure AD Graph APIs will be unable to proceed utilizing these APIs beginning in early September 2025,” Microsoft famous again in late June 2025.
Cloud security firm Mitiga mentioned a profitable exploitation of CVE-2025-55241 can bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), Conditional Entry, and logging, leaving no path of the incident.
“Attackers may craft these [actor] tokens in ways in which tricked Entra ID into considering they had been anybody, wherever,” Mitiga’s Roei Sherman mentioned. “The vulnerability arose as a result of the legacy API didn’t validate the tenant supply of the token.”
“This meant that an attacker may get hold of an Actor token from their very own, non-privileged check atmosphere after which use it to impersonate a International Admin in some other firm’s tenant. The attacker did not want any pre-existing entry to the goal group.”
Beforehand, Mollema additionally detailed a high-severity security flaw affecting on-premise variations of Alternate Server (CVE-2025-53786, CVSS rating: 8.0) that would enable an attacker to achieve elevated privileges underneath sure situations. One other piece of analysis discovered that Intune certificates misconfigurations (akin to spoofable identifiers) may be abused by common customers to carry out an ESC1 assault focusing on Energetic Listing environments.
The event comes weeks after Binary Safety’s Haakon Holm Gulbrandsrud disclosed that the shared API Supervisor (APIM) occasion used to facilitate software-as-a-service (SaaS) connectors may be invoked instantly from the Azure Useful resource Supervisor to attain cross-tenant entry.
“API Connections enable anybody to completely compromise some other connection worldwide, giving full entry to the linked backend,” Gulbrandsrud mentioned. “This contains cross-tenant compromise of Key Vaults and Azure SQL databases, in addition to some other externally linked service, akin to Jira or Salesforce.”
It additionally follows the invention of a number of cloud-related flaws and assault strategies in latest weeks –
- An Entra ID OAuth misconfiguration that granted unauthorized entry to Microsoft’s Engineering Hub Rescue even with a private Microsoft account, exposing 22 inner providers and related information.
- An assault that exploits Microsoft OneDrive for Enterprise Recognized Folder Transfer (KFM) function, permitting a foul actor who compromises a Microsoft 365 person with OneDrive sync to achieve entry to their apps and information synced to SharePoint On-line.
- The leak of Azure AD utility credentials in a publicly accessible Software Settings (appsettings.json) file that would have been exploited to authenticate instantly towards Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 endpoints, and exfiltrate delicate information, deploy malicious apps, or escalate privileges.
- A phishing assault containing a hyperlink to a rogue OAuth utility registered in Microsoft Azure that tricked a person into granting it permissions to extract Amazon Internet Providers (AWS) entry keys for a sandbox atmosphere throughout the compromised mailbox, permitting unknown actors to enumerate AWS permissions and exploit a belief relationship between the sandbox and manufacturing environments to raise privileges, achieve full management over the group’s AWS infrastructure, and exfiltrate delicate information.
- An assault that includes exploiting Server-Aspect Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in net functions to ship requests to the AWS EC2 metadata service with the objective of accessing the Occasion Metadata Service (IMDS) to compromise cloud sources by retrieving non permanent security credentials assigned to the occasion’s IAM position.
- A now-patched difficulty in AWS’s Trusted Advisor instrument that might be exploited to sidestep S3 Safety Checks by tweaking sure storage bucket insurance policies, inflicting the instrument to incorrectly report publicly-exposed S3 buckets as safe, thereby leaving delicate information uncovered to information exfiltration and data breaches.
- A way code AWSDoor that modifies IAM configurations associated to AWS position and belief insurance policies to arrange persistence on AWS environments.
The findings present that even all-too-common misconfigurations in cloud environments can have disastrous penalties for the organizations concerned, resulting in information theft and different follow-on assaults.
“Strategies akin to AccessKey injection, belief coverage backdooring, and the usage of NotAction insurance policies enable attackers to persist with out deploying malware or triggering alarms,” RiskInsight researchers Yoann Dequeker and Arnaud Petitcol mentioned in a report revealed final week.
“Past IAM, attackers can leverage AWS sources themselves – akin to Lambda capabilities and EC2 cases – to keep up entry. Disabling CloudTrail, modifying occasion selectors, deploying lifecycle insurance policies for silent S3 deletion, or detaching accounts from AWS Organizations are all strategies that scale back oversight and allow long-term compromise or destruction.”
